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The article discusses the development of political conditonality
in the process of the EU enlargement. It uses the concept of
the Power of Membership (POM), which is defined as an advantage a member state has,
by the virtue of its veto power, over a country that has applied for
the membership in the EU, with a view to winning concessions from such an applicant.
In the past (with the exception of France in the 1960s), the POM has been
carefolly applied by the EU members which wanted to win certain concessions
from candidate states. However, recently the POM has assumed a new dimension,
because some of the EU members have introduced referendum as a 'final check'
for candidate states (except Croatia). This move seems to have a specific goal:
to prevent Turkey, which has started accession talks, to become afull EU member.
The article argues that this may have negative consequences for the success
of the EU enlargement process and can undermine efforts
to create stability in Europe as a whole.
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1. Introduction
This article focuses on the conceptualization
and analysis of an increasingly important factor in
the process of widening the membership in interna-
tional organizations that often escapes the attention
of scholars - the so-called Power of Membership
(POM). In the context of the European Union (EU),
the POM is defined as an advantage a member state
has, by virtue of its veto power, over a country that
has applied for the membership in the EU, with a
view to winning concessions from such an applicant.
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Such, essentially political conditionality can be mani-
fested unilaterally, jointly (two or more member
states can use the POM because of similar concerns
over issues raised with an EU applicant) or collec-
tively (where the POM against an EU applicant is
demonstrated by the EU membership as a whole).
The POM typically (but not as a rule) emerges out
of unresolved issues between a member (or several
members) and the applicant. These issues may not
necessarily be strictly connected to the main criteria
for the membership (such as the adoption of the
acquis) yet they still need to be resolved before a
candidate becomes a member. Hence, a 'European
solution' for the problem is sought. There is a very
thin line between what an EU applicant may per-
ceive as a 'European solution', and something it
could simply see as an attempt of 'extortion'; hence,
the outcome of negotiations may be difficult to pre-
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diet, In this respect, the POM could assume a double
role. It can be instrumental in solving open issues
between the EU members and EU candidates, be-
cause neither the parties to the dispute nor the EU
want to 'import' unresolved bilateral problems that
could damage intra-membership relations. On the
other hand, the POM can also have a damaging ef-
fect on the enlargement process in cases where the
EU candidates feel they face demands that are im-
possible to fulfill, or have even been denied a Euro-
pean perspective altogether.
After the 'big bang' in 2004, the biggest ever
enlargement in the EU history (10 states have been
admitted as new members) the POM seemed to have
assumed a new, and rather worrying political dimen-
sion. Namely, some of the EU member states have
decided to reallocate decision-making about future
members from the government to the public sphere,
by introducing the referendum as a final check for
the EU candidates on their way to the membership.
This means that the importance of the POM as an
ultimate negotiating tool for members to resolve open
issues with EU candidates has been significantly re-
duced. Using the POM as a tool for extracting con-
cessions leads to predictable results: if concessions
are won, a candidate country has secured its entrance
in the EU. Using a referendum to confirm the entry
of a candidate country to the EU gives this country
an important democratic legitimacy, but the outcome
of a referendum could be uncertain. Such an uncer-
tainty, in turn, could mean that the candidate would
not be motivated to internalize European norms and
values, a sine qua non for the Union to keep up its
cohesion and internal stability, and strengthen its
external security. I
The present article sets out to explore the ex-
tent and scope of the POM in the enlargement proc-
ess. In the past, there have been several cases where
the use of the POM could be discerned. The most
blatant among them has been the French condition-
ing of the British membership in the EU. The cur-
rent EU candidates (Croatia, Macedonia,' and Tur-
key) have many bilateral issues they may need to
resolve along their way toward the EU. In not doing
so, they may risk the exercise of the POM by the
respective EU members, or have indeed already ex-
perienced it. The article will analyze these develop-
ments. The relevance of the findings and their im-
plications for European integration in the light of
recent developments, especially the conditioning of
the entrance of new members by a referendum, will
be discussed in the concluding chapter.
2. Experience with the POM
by the EU Members: The Case
of British Candidacy
The reasons for the French demonstration of
the POM to the British throughout the 1960s are com-
plex. While the jury is still out as to the balance of
political and economic concerns, it seems plausible
to say that, in the light of scholarly arguments' and
media reporting in the period 1960-1969, both con-
cerns featured high in the French consideration of
the British entry into the EEC. From the political
perspective, the French concerns about the British
entry seemed to be about the leadership. The French
government did not like what it felt was a transat-
lantic dimension of the British candidacy. Britain was
the major US ally and it favored global free trade. In
the eyes of the French, especially President De
Gaulle, Britain as a full member of the EEC would
be a kind of Trojan horse for the 'infiltration' of
American interests in European Communities' af-
fairs." In the light of the failed Fouchet plan for a
political union, many historians agreed, De Gaulle
was even more determined to keep the British at bay,
at least until the consolidation of the Communities
(according to the French interests") had been carried
out. From the economic perspective, France's main
concern was the Common Agricultural Policy. The
latter was in its infant stages, yet it had been based
on a German-French deal: the creation of a common
market (which benefited a rapidly industrializing
Germany) for a centrally subsidized agriculture
(which benefited France and its huge agricultural
sector, amounting to about 25 % of its GDP at the
time). It was thought in Paris that if Britain were to
become an equal member of the EEC, given its
economy structure, comparable with that of Germany
(i.e. an economy with a very small agricultural sec-
tor), Bonn and London would have undoubtedly pur-
sued the policy of opening the European agricultural
sector to world markets rather than spend money on
supporting European (mainly French) farmers.
The political discourse that the French gov-
ernment sought to introduce to defend its specific
national concerns about the British application for
the membership in the European Communities oc-
casionally referred to Britain as being unable to ap-
preciate 'European problems' and look for 'Euro-
pean solutions'. For example, in a 1963 press con-
ference De Gaulle justified his decision to block the
British entry by saying that Britain was not "ready"
for the EEC membership, both economically and
politically." He claimed that the British understand-
ing of how the EEC was supposed to work was not
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that of the EEC's. In the same period, the French
foreign minister Maurice Couve de Murville was
reported to have said that the origins and the signifi-
cance of the crisis related to the British candidacy
for the EEC membership stemmed from Britain's
inability to accommodate itself fully to the "Euro-
pean character of the Common Market".' Little did
it matter in such circumstances whether the position
of one country is shared with others - and in the
case of the British entry, France stood alone against
the rest of the Six. But the 'European' language was
still used as an argument to justify the reasons of
why Britain was not yet 'ready' to become an EEC
member. This has not changed until the late 1960s
when Georges Pompidou, who succeeded De Gaulle
as the President of France, opened the door to Brit-
ain, which eventually joined in 1973.
3. The POM and the EU
Candidates - An Overview
There seem to be many issues unresolved in
the part of the Southeastern Europe that yet needs to
be integrated in the EU. Currently three states from
the region enjoy the status of the EU candidates.
These are Croatia, Macedonia, and Turkey. Croatia,
which began its accession negotiations in October
2005, has some open bilateral issues with its
neighbors Italy and Slovenia, which could lead to
the exercise of the paM. These include the fishing
rights, and the border problems which Croatia has
with Slovenia. Turkey, which, like Croatia, began
its accession negotiations in 2005, has much tougher
issues to resolve with its neighbors. The EU mem-
bers that share borders with Turkey and Macedonia
are Greece, Cyprus, and Bulgaria, but it seems that
only Greece and Cyprus could represent an obstacle
for Turkey." The relations between Greece and Tur-
key suffer from history-driven animosities, which had
been further exacerbated by the conflict in Cyprus
in 1974, which led to the creation ofa new state, the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The problem
of the division of the island has become further com-
plicated because Cyprus has become a member of
the EU. As for Macedonia, Athens and Skopje seem
unable to separate cultural issues from bilateral inter-
governmental relations. The causes of disagreement
are the two diametrically opposing narratives on the
cultural and geographical space of 'Macedonia'.
These narratives are symbolized by the so-called
name issue, i.e. the disagreement as to what name
should Macedonia use in its international relations.
4. The EU Candidates from
the Former Yugoslavia and
Their Neighbors
Croatia
Because of a long and devastating war in the
1990s, Croatia was late to apply for a membership
in the EU. This happened in 2003. A year later,
Croatia officially became a candidate country and in
late 2005, it started accession negotiations with the
EU. Before the accession negotiations, the Croatian
government had already been faced with the paM.
Because of its lack of cooperation with the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) with regard to Ante Gotovina, a former gen-
eral and a local hero sought for war crimes he alleg-
edly committed during the war in Croatia," the
Croatian government could not reach a breakthrough
in an attempt to foster its integration into the EU.
Dissatisfied with Zagreb's efforts to fmd Gotovina,
the British and Dutch governments had demonstrated
the PO'M by suspending the ratification of the
Stabilization and Association Agreement, which the
EU signed with Croatia already in 2001.10
Since the Gotovina case, Croatia has had dif-
ferent things to worry about while on its road to the
EU membership - the already mentioned fishing
rights and the border problems, which concerned its
neighbors in the Adriatic. The issue that spurred the
political debate and even tensions has been the proc-
lamation of the so-called ecological and fisheries
protection zone, which the Croatian parliament de-
clared in October 2003, and was due to enter into
force in 2004. The decision upset Italy and Slovenia.
For Italy, such a zone would significantly reduce the
possibilities for Italian fishermen to fish in the Adri-
atic. For Slovenia, this decision was also problem-
atic. Slovenia has a total of just over 40 km of the
coast to the Adriatic Sea, and all of it is in a small
Piran Bay. Croatia's mainland coast to the Adriatic
Sea is over 1,700 km long and goes almost parallel
with the Italian coastline. Slovenia was worried that
the decision would pre-empt the decision about the
borderline on the sea and that Croatia would extend
its jurisdiction in the Adriatic Sea by declaring an
exclusive economic zone. In such a case, Croatia and
Italy would 'close' the Adriatic see and effectively
kill Slovenia's attempts to get a free access to inter-
national waters. 11
After the Croatian Parliament's decision, sev-
eral meetings of the three foreign ministers and other
state officials took place in early 2004, at which Italy
and Slovenia called for a 'European solution' to the
problem. Croatia had to decide whether it wished to
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insist on its 2003 decision on the ecological and fish-
eries protection zone or revise it. In such a case,
Croatia would have risked a delay in getting a status
of an EU candidate. At that time, Italy still had not
ratified the SAA and Slovenia had already become a
member of the EU. Finally, Zagreb agreed in 2004
that the decision on the zone would not be imple-
mented in full, i.e. temporarily it would not apply to
the EU members. 12 Italy ratified the SAA in October
2004, being the last EU member to do so. However,
at the end of 2006, the Croatian Parliament adopted
a decision that the ecological and fisheries protec-
tion zone would be applicable to EU members as of
1 January 2008. At the beginning of 2008, Croatia
did not further postpone the decision of the Croatian
Parliament as expected by the EU, which led to a
crisis in accession negotiations.
At the time of writing, the way out from the
stalemate between Croatia and the EU was not yet
determined. It was equally unclear what a new for-
mula might be that could lead to a 'European solu-
tion' which would settle the border problems between
Slovenia and Croatia that could avoid the risk of
Slovenia's attempt to use the POM in the accession
process. The Croatian government has stated on
many occasions that arbitration is the only means it
would accept to resolve the border dispute. Slovenia
had for a long time maintained that diplomatic means
had not yet been exhausted and that leaving such a
sensitive matter to an arbiter "would not contribute
to good neighborly relations of the two European
countries.t'" Recently, the Slovenian position has
changed somewhat. At a meeting in August 2007,
prime ministers Janez Jansa and Ivo Sanader agreed
in principle that the border dispute should be settled
by arbitration, presumably at the International Court
of Justice in the Hague." Be that as it may, the fact
that any perception of the public of either of the two
countries that their government has 'lost' more in
negotiations than the other would almost certainly
cause a political suicide of that particular govern-
ment. In taking a broader perspective on the situa-
tion, however, it could be argued that the two gov-
ernments seem trapped in a paradox situation. The
border problems may be burdening bilateral relations
politically, but at the same time the two economies
are heavily interdependent. In terms of export, for
example, Croatia is among Slovenia's four major
trading partners; the data for Croatia show the same
picture." In this respect, economic interdependence
as an incentive for the two governments to come to a
mutually acceptable approach to solving outstand-
ing problems which they have inherited as a conse-
quence of the break-up of Yugoslavia should per-
haps come more to the fore in the negotiations be-
tween the two governments.
Macedonia
The evolution of relations between Greece and
Macedonia has had a rocky start. After Macedonia
declared independence in 1991, the Greek govern-
ment refused to recognize the new country. When
explaining its policy toward Macedonia, the Greek
government cited cultural, historical, and security
reasons. The government could not accept that the
name, which it considered as the pillar of the Greek
history and identity, would be used by another coun-
try, with a Slavic population. In addition, the gov-
ernment believed that the basic symbols of the new
country, (the flag, the Constitution, and the ethnic
maps) have demonstrated irredentist claims against
Greece. 16 The pressure to change the name was met
with resistance in Macedonia, 17 but the Macedonian
government offered a compromise in 1992, by add-
ing the name of its capital, Skopje, to the name of
the country. The new name, the 'Republic of Mac-
edonia (Skopje)' had not been acceptable to Greece,
which wanted that the word 'Macedonia' be removed
altogether. It was at this point that Greece began to
demonstrate its POM. Because of Greek objections,
the EU members decided at the Lisbon Council in
1992 that they would not recognize the Republic of
Macedonia unless it changed its name, i.e. left out
the word 'Macedonia'. Thereafter, negotiations about
the name under which Macedonia was to be accepted
in the international community continued. The dead-
lock was broken, much to Greece's dismay, by a third
party; in 1993, the United Nations (UN) admitted
Macedonia as a new member state under a provi-
sional name the Former Yugoslav Republic of Mac-
edonia. 18 The new Greek government under Georgios
Papandreou got increasingly impatient with Macedo-
nia. Eventually, Greece unilaterally left negotiations
in fall 1993. Athens decided to put a pressure on
Macedonia by imposing a trade embargo against it
in February 1994. The policy of trade embargo, which
lasted until October of the same year, backfired on
Greece. Athens has lost the support in the EU. The
Commission promptly reacted to Greece's pressure
on Macedonia. In spring 1994, the Commission
brought Greece before the European Court of Jus-
tice, arguing that unilateral embargoes by any of the
EU members constituted the violation of the Com-
munities' law." Six EU members have decided to
recognize Macedonia under its provisional name.
Perhaps the major disappointment for Greece came
in the fall of 1994, when the United States recog-
nized Macedonia under its constitutional name.
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Meanwhile, Greece returned to negotiations and, with
the brokerage by the United States, the compromise
solution had finally been found. The so-called In-
terim Accord was signed between Greece and Mac-
edonia in 1995. All the concerns except for the name
have been successfully addressed - as for the name
issue, the two governments have agreed in the Ac-
cord that they would continue to negotiate on it.20
Subsequently, the Greek government ended the trade
embargo and the Commission dropped its charges
against Greece."
Since then, the relations between the two states
have improved considerably. In 1995, Greece rec-
ommended to the Council of Europe to invite Mac-
edonia to become a member. In the same year, it lifted
its objections against the Macedonian participation
in the OSCE, and supported the joining of Macedo-
nia to the NATO Partnership for Peace. An impor-
tant signal of Greece's support for Macedonia was
first received in 2000, when the Feira Council rec-
ognized Macedonia as a potential candidate for the
EU membership. Since then, Greece has remained
consistent in helping to pave the way for Macedonia
to become an EU member. In 2001, a Stabilization
and Association Agreement between Macedonia and
the EU was signed. The Agreement entered into force
in 2004, and in 2005, the EU members agreed to grant
to Macedonia the status of a candidate country. Eco-
nomic relations have also improved dramatically; for
example, Greece is now Macedonia's third most
important trading partner,"
However, the name issue still looms large over
the Greek-Macedonian relations. The Macedonian
government would prefer using its constitutional
name in international relations and a mutually ac-
ceptable name in bilateral relations with Greece. Pre-
dictably, this position is not acceptable to the Greek
government. In 2005, the United Nations special
envoy for Macedonia, Matthew Nimetz, recom-
mended that the country be known internationally
as 'Republika Makedonia-Skopje'. The Greek gov-
ernment did not reject the proposal outright: Petros
Molyviatis, the Greek foreign minister, said that the
proposal did not' 'totally satisfy" but could be a ba-
sis for negotiation." The solution does not seem to
be on sight. The Interim Accord prohibits Greece
and Macedonia from blocking each other's member-
ship in international institutions, but only under the
condition that the mutually accepted provisional
name - the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-
nia - is used." If the two states did not succeed in
finding a solution, or if Macedonia insisted on using
its constitutional name internationally, facing with
the reality of Greece's POM might be inevitable. The
Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyanis has made
that clear after the Macedonian government decided
at the end of 2006 to rename its international airport
after the Alexander the Great (also known as Alex-
ander of Macedonia). Indicating that Athens consid-
ered the decision as a provocation, she said that such
a move by Skopje "does not further its Euro-Atlan-
tic aspirations"," and it is likely to become one of
the factors to determine the date of the beginning of
the EU-Macedonia entry talks as well."
5. Turkey and Its Neighbors
Greece and Turkey
For a long time, relations between Greece and
Turkey had mostly been those of mistrust and con-
flict. Besides the problem of Cyprus, the two states
have been entangled in a host of unresolved issues,
such as the delimitation of the continental shelf, the
demarcation of territorial waters, the control of air
space, the militarization of the east Aegean islands,
and the question ofthe Turkish minority in Greece."
These problems have largely remained unresolved.
However, the relations between Greece and Turkey
have seen a considerable improvement since 1999.
The Greek government had fundamentally changed
its perception of Turkey. Athens seemed to have con-
cluded that it was in the Greek interest to have a
stable and viable neighbor, open to cooperation. The
Greek government took an initiative to improve its
relations with Ankara by signaling several gestures
of goodwill to solve the outstanding issues by peace-
ful means. In the catastrophic earthquake in Turkey
in 1999, Greece was the first to offer help. The ges-
ture was reciprocated when the earthquake hit Greece
a month later. As a clear signal of the desire to en-
hance the dialogue with Turkey, in December 1999
at the Helsinki EU Council Greece removed its ob-
jections to giving Turkey a status of a candidate for
the EU membership. Since then, Greece has been
actively supporting Turkish aspirations for a full EU
membership. In the preparation for its presidency in
the first half of 2003, the Greek Minister for Euro-
pean Affairs Tassos Yiannitsis stated that keeping
the Turkish candidacy on a "front burner" was one
of Greek priorities: "Turkey and the EU have very
close economic relations and common strategic in-
terests. The relationship has to develop and Greece
will make sure the door to the EU is kept wide open
for Turkey. "28 Indeed, the door has remained opened
to the extent that Turkey could begin its accession
talks in October 2005.
The Greek approach has paid dividends. Tur-
key, especially under the conservative government,
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led by Recep Tayypi Erdogan has made its pro-West-
ern orientation with an eye clearly set toward Eu-
rope, rather than the expansion to the East, a prior-
ity. Under the leadership ofErdogan, Turkey has gone
through a substantial reform process, which Thomas
Diez" (2005: 168) says can "only be called a revo-
lution: sweeping constitutional and legal changes
have been approved by Parliament; a party with reli-
gious roots has been elected to form a single-party
government; relationships with Greece have become
as between friendly neighbors (although not free from
conflicts)." The confidence-building process in mili-
tary relations is under way. For instance, it was agreed
in 2003 that officers of both armies should partici-
pate as observers of each of the two states' military
exercises." In 2004, the Turkish Prime Minister vis-
ited Greece, which was the first official visit of a
Turkish Prime Minister to Greece since 1988. Since
1990, when Turkey had but a minor share in Greece's
trade, things have changed dramatically. Fifteen years
on, Turkey is Greece's eighth largest trading part-
ner."
The decision of the Greek government not to
slow down or even stall the Turkish progress toward
the EU membership anymore has gotten an additional
political dimension. Formerly perceived as a coun-
try, which, with its anti-Turkish position, had been
the bulwark of the EU against European ambitions
of Turkey, Greece, is now one of the main support-
ers of the Turkish full integration in the EU. This, in
turn, has de facto forced other member states to deal
with Turkey more actively. Some states, especially
France and Austria, stepped forward to 'fill the
vacuum' left by Greece, and so they have made it
clear that they have considerable reservations regard-
ing the Turkish membership in the EU. In this re-
spect, one should bear in mind that the EU also has
benefited from Greece's changing approach to Tur-
key. Because of lesser tensions between Greece and
Turkey, the stability of the Southeastern region as a
whole has improved.
Cyprus and Turkey
The rapprochement between Turkey and
Greece has not led to a solution of the Cyprus issue
before Cyprus entered the EU, even though much
effort had been invested to this end. After the Cold
War, the European Commission attempted to seize
an opportunity given to it in 1990 when Cyprus ap-
plied for EU membership. The Commission, in its
opinion of 1993, hinted that it would condition the
membership with the unification of the island. Yet
this opinion had been unrealistic, because it was to
be expected that Greece would push for an EU mem-
bership for Cyprus regardless of whether there would
be unification or not. Moreover, Greece has been
repeatedly pointing out that there would be no EU
enlargement to the East if Cyprus were not admitted
to the EU.32 Such "apocalyptic noises'?' had been
toned down as the relations between Greece and
Turkey were improving, and a new effort to unify
the island had been made. Thus, the UN drafted the
so-called Annan plan to reunite the island. The plan,
presented in its final form for a referendum to both
parts of the island in April 2004, proposed the for-
mation of a 'new' Cyprus: a loose federation of the
Turkish and Greek entities. The plan was embraced
by the people of Northern Cyprus who also voted in
favor of the plan. The Turkish government had even
made an unprecedented move in exercising pressure
on the former Turkish Cypriot leader RaufDenktash
to accept the plan, but he has refused to do so. Con-
sequently, Ankara turned its back to Denktash, who
in addition to that lost the elections in 2005 to a pro-
EU contender Mehmet Ali Talat. The Greek govern-
ment had joined Turkey in supporting the plan. This
support seemed particularly strong in the beginning
of2004, when the compromise between the Turkish
and Greek Cypriots was being feverishly sought.
However, the influence of Greece had been some-
what weakened because of the national elections,
which took place in that very same period.
Konstandinos Karamanlis, who took over the gov-
ernment from Papandreu in March 2004, somehow
came 'late into the game' - there was not much time
left to persuade the Greek Cypriot's President Tassos
Papadopoulos to accept the plan. While the reasons
for Papadopoulos' reservations against the plan
which ultimately convinced the Cypriot voters are
more complex and should be analyzed beyond the
role Athens (might have) had in the process," it is
important to note that these reasons had much to deal
with the basic structure of a unified Cyprus accord-
ing to the Annan plan. Unlike the Turkish commu-
nity, the Greek Cypriots felt that the plan leaned too
much toward a confederation; indeed, goes the ar-
gument, it even ran against what seemed to be a com-
mon understanding between the two communities
since the late 1970s, namely that neither a unitary
state nor a confederation were options for the future
solution of the Cyprus problem," and that a bi-zonal,
bi-communal federation was to be sought."
In the wake of the failed referendum, the EU
had promised to ease isolation of the Turkish Cy-
prus. In 2004, the Commission proposed an approval
of a financial aid in the amount ofEUR 259 million
for Northern Cyprus in 2006. The package should
have come with an arrangement that would have es-
tablished direct trade between the EU and the Turk-
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ish part of the Cyprus, thus ending its isolation."
This was unacceptable for Nicosia. Fearful that any
direct relations between the EU and Northern Cy-
prus might mean a de facto recognition of the latter,
Nicosia has remained adamant that it would not give
its vote to the Commission's proposal unless the aid
package was clearly decoupled from proposed di-
rect trade regulations." Eventually, this happened in
early 2006, when the Council was able to adopt the
aid in the amount ofEUR 139 million (the rest was
lost because deadlines for the use of the 2005 EU
budget had been missed). Cyprus has made it clear
that it would only give a green light to more relaxed
trade relations between the EU and the Northern
Cyprus if Turkey honored its obligations under the
Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement,"
which extends the Customs Union between Turkey
and the EU to all the EU members, including Cy-
prus. However, Turkey has refused to open its ports
and harbors to vessels from Cyprus unless the EU
opened up traffic to the harbor in Famagusta and the
Ercan airport, which are vital for Northern Cyprus
to generate revenues on its own from tourism. But
Cyprus does not see this as a 'European' solution.
The Foreign Minister of Cyprus Yiorgos Lillikas has
commented that "Turkey is trying to have something
in return for fulfilling its obligations - it is not hap-
pening and we won't allow it to happen ... Turkey
should forget about the Anatolian bazaar."
It seems clear, therefore, that Cyprus will not
hesitate to use the POM to protect its interests, al-
though the question where to draw the line in seek-
ing concessions from Turkey remains open. The main
point of departure for Cyprus, i.e. to become recog-
nized by Turkey, is a sine qua non for seeking a com-
promise. Furthermore, Turkey would need to show
some goodwill by opening the door to international
organizations such as the OECD to which Cyprus
might want to join but cannot due to the Turkish veto.
At the same time, Cyprus will need to remain open
as to the kind of political arrangement for the island
that will be acceptable to the majority of the popula-
tion on the island. Both communities ultimately have
to realize that it is in their interest to find a compro-
mise, simply because political and economic ben-
efits that would spring out of it cannot be overlooked.
The unification of the island would enhance stabil-
ity in the EU and in the region, facilitate economic
aid to the whole of the island, further improve the
Greco- Turkish relationships, and increase revenues
from tourism and trade. Like Greece, Cyprus is and
should be interested in having a stable neighbor, and
keep Turkey on track for a full membership. Turkey,
for its part, has already demonstrated that it sees a
stable relationship with neighbors as an important
part of its path toward the European Union. Sadly,
there has been an unexpected development in the
meantime, which may well have a damaging effect
on the unification process in Cyprus. Namely, the
European perspective for Turkey has recently been
put in an entirely new context, never seen before in
the EU enlargement process - its membership has
become conditioned by a positive referendum out-
come in certain member states.
6. Turkey and the European Union
The Turkish bid for the membership in the EU
has given the process of enlargement an entirely new
dimension, which significantly undermines the POM
as a negotiating tool. Namely, some EU members
have introduced much tougher conditions for admit-
ting new candidates than ever before in the EU his-
tory. France, for instance, has adopted a constitu-
tional requirement that a referendum for any further
enlargement beyond Croatia must be organized. Es-
sentially, the requirement has been aimed at Turkey,
but it may hit other EU aspirants as well. The former
French President Jacques Chirac admitted that it
would indeed be tough for Turkey to convince the
French voters, but he appeared somewhat more op-
timistic about the prospects of other EU candidates.
Using Macedonia as an example, Chirac said that
this small country should easily win the French pub-
lic because it was a "sympathetic" one." Austria,
too, will leave the decision about the accession of
all the candidates, except Croatia, to its public. It
also has openly declared its doubts whether Turkey
will ever be able to become a full member of the
EU. According to the Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang
Schussel, Turkey's future with the EU should instead
be seen in the context of the European Neighbour-
hood Policy." During his campaign for the next
French president, Nicolas Sarkozy had been equally
adamant. In his view, the EU should expand to the
Western Balkans "when the countries in the region
are ready", and to Norway as well as Iceland and
Switzerland, "whenever they want". As for Turkey,
he said, while there are many interests Turkey and
the EU share, Turkey should not gain a full member-
ship but only that of a "privileged partner." 42
Such dealings by the EU members with present
and future candidates show a worrisome departure
from the conventional use of the POM. Referendum
is of course the highest form of democratic decision-
making, but its use could have negative consequences
for the EU, because it jeopardizes the main rationale
of the European integration - the unification of Eu-
rope. By the very act of giving a green light to Tur-
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key to start EU accession negotiations, Turkey has
become a part of the unification process. At the very
least, the use of the referendum, as a [mal hurdle an
EU candidate must clear to become a member, sym-
bolizes the use of double standards applied in the
membership negotiations. The subjecting of the en-
largement process to the instrument of referendum
undermines the importance the POM can have for
member states. In the new circumstances, the POM
has now become an insufficient guarantee for the
EU members that compromises made with EU ap-
plicants would actually be implemented. Put differ-
ently, concessions given by the EU applicants do not
provide any guarantee for them that the final goal,
the EU membership, would eventually be accom-
plished. A clear European perspective has arguably
played a major role in the improvement of relations
between Greece and Turkey." Now that Turkey -
and not just Turkey - needs to "win the hearts and
minds of the Europeans?" as declared by the Presi-
dent of the European Commission Barroso, the pur-
pose of negotiations has become somewhat compro-
mised.
7. Conclusion: Is POM Still
Relevant in EU Membership
Negotiations?
The POM has always been an integral part of
the enlargement process, but as has been shown here,
its use has rarely threatened to halt the process alto-
gether. The POM has only once been used with a
clear intention to deny a European perspective to an
EU aspirant. This has happened in the 1960s, when
De Gaulle's France was blocking the British entry
into the Union. Mostly, the POM has been used as a
facilitator of unresolved issues between the
neighbors. Candidate countries generally have been
willing to enter such negotiations and work on com-
promise. In some ways, one could even argue that
the use of the POM (or the threat of using it) has had
a positive effect on relations between neighbors,
members and non-members of the EU.1t is conceiv-
able that in the end the EU membership and indeed
the credibility of a member will lead to a compro-
mise solution between Croatia and Slovenia. The lure
of the EU membership has played its part in the im-
provement of the Greco-Turkish relations. Greece,
which had had a hostile relationship with Turkey for
decades, has changed its policy toward Turkey and
its EU aspirations since the end of the 1990s, to which
Turkey has responded positively, especially under
the Erdogan government. The rapprochement has
yielded benefits to both states. On the other hand, if
used as a zero-sum game, the POM is likely to back-
fire on the EU member, as has happened to Greece
when the government decided in 1994 to use an eco-
nomic embargo as a means of pressure on Macedo-
nia to change its name.
Tackling the challenge of enlargement in
Southeastern Europe has never been easy. The de-
velopments in the 1990s have only made things
worse. This is especially true for the Western Bal-
kans. Many of the states from this subregion have
endured a long and a devastating war in the 1990s.
Many unresolved political issues have been left be-
hind, people have been driven out of their homes
with a slim chance to return, and new ethnic maps
have been drawn. If one adds Turkey to this picture,
given that its candidacy itself also has historical pro-
portions (never before has a country with predomi-
nant Muslim population applied for the EU mem-
bership), and the picture of the EU's soul-searching
with regard to Southeastern Europe is complete.
Nevertheless, the integration of the region as a whole
into the EU is inevitable; the EU member states re-
affirmed that in Thessaloniki in 2003. However, to
recognize the need to further enlarge is one thing; to
recognize that a country is 'ready' to become an EU
member is quite another. As has been shown in this
article EU aspirants from the region have tough is-
sues that they still need to deal with. In the case of
Macedonia, the so-called 'name issue' persists on
the negotiation table, Turkey faces some daunting
challenges, such as its relations with Cyprus over
the status of the self-proclaimed Turkish Cypriot
state, which only Turkey recognizes. There are some
serious economic concerns. The Turkish agricultural
sector makes about 40 % of the Turkish GDP. On
these grounds alone, there are many years ahead and
many tough negotiations will have been held before
Turkey could be considered fit for the EU member-
ship."
It is important to bear in mind, however, that
under the new circumstances even if negotiations,
including the exercise of the POM, are successful
and Turkey or any other candidate beyond Croatia is
ready (i.e. the country meets the economic and po-
litical criteria and governments have no other objec-
tions to the Turkish candidacy), the result is not go-
ing to guarantee the actual membership. In some EU
members, the popular vote will decide, and it is by
no means certain which factors might lead people to
vote for or against the membership of a candidate.
Take for instance the role of religion in discussion
of merits to allow Turkey to become an EU member.
One should not forget that Turkey is a secular state,
yet parts of the European public see the fact that the
majority of the Turkish population is Muslim as prob-
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lematic. Of course, religion is not listed as the crite-
ria for EU membership. The EU law says SO,46 and
so do for example Gunter Verheugen, a Commis-
sioner responsible for enlargement in the Prodi Com-
mission," and the current Head of the EU Commis-
sion, Jose Manuel Barroso." Nevertheless, given the
prominent role the religion has in Europe, the public
may not be of the same opinion. If the argument of
religion won the day (or in fact any argument relat-
ing to 'cultural' differences), it could prove costly
for the future of Europe. One should not forget that
the population in Albania is 70 % Muslim. The
Kosovo Albanians, who aim at a full independence,
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